Logical characterizations of the common prior assumption (CPA) are investigated. Two approaches are considered. The rst is called frame distinguishability, and is similar in spirit to the approaches considered in the economics literature. Results similar to those obtained in the economics literature are proved here as well, namely, that we can distinguish nite spaces that satisfy the CPA from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, it is shown that, for the language used here, no formulas can distinguish in nite spaces satisfying the CPA from those that do not. The second approached considered is that of nding a sound and complete axiomatization. Such an axiomatization is provided; again, the key axiom involves disagreements in expectation. The same axiom system is shown to be sound and complete both in the nite and the in nite case. Thus, the two approaches to characterizing the CPA behave quite di erently in the case of in nite spaces.
Introduction
The common prior assumption (CPA) is one that, up until quite recently, was almost an article of faith among economists. This assumption says that di erences in beliefs among agents can be completely explained by di erences in information. Essentially, the picture is that agents start out with identical prior beliefs (the common prior) and then condition on the information that they later receive. If their later beliefs di er, it must thus be due to the fact that they have received di erent information.
The CPA has played a prominent role in economic theory. Harsanyi 1968] showed that a game of incomplete information could be reduced to a standard game of imperfect information information with an initial move by nature i individuals could be viewed as having a common prior over some state space. Aumann 1976] showed that individuals with a common prior could not \agree to disagree"; that is, if their posteriors were derived from a common prior and they had common knowledge of their posterior probabilities of a particular event, these posteriors would have to be the same.
The CPA has come under a great deal of scrutiny recently. (See Morris 1995] for an overview.) In an e ort to try to understand the implications of the CPA better, there have been a number of attempts to characterize the CPA. Of most relevance here are the results of Bonanno and Nehring 1996] , Feinberg 1995 Feinberg , 1996 , Morris 1994] , and Samet 1996] , who all showed that, in nite spaces, the common prior could be characterized by a disagreement in expectations, in a sense explained below. Feinberg 1996] extended this result to in nite spaces that satis ed a certain compactness condition, and also showed that this compactness condition was necessary.
This paper continues these e orts. I characterize the CPA using traditional tools from modal logic, and compare these characterizations to those used in the economics literature. In the process, I highlight the role of the language used in getting a characterization. Feinberg 1996] showed how to characterize the CPA in syntactic terms, essentially using a logic with operators for knowledge and probability. I use a much richer language here, one introduced in Fagin and Halpern 1994] , which has operators for knowledge, common knowledge, and probability. Feinberg's language is weaker than that used here in two signi cant respects. The rst is that it does not include an operator for common knowledge. To get around this, his characterization involves in nite sets of formulas. The second is that the operators in his language do not allow us to express expectation. In particular, this means that disagreement in expectation cannot be expressed. Feinberg gets around this by an ingenious construction that involves adding coin tosses to the description of the world, in order to construct a more complex model. In this model, disagreement in expectation is converted to disagreement between two agents about the probability of an event, and this fact can be expressed in Feinberg's language. By using a richer language, the need for this construction is completely obviated.
However, characterizing the CPA involves more than just language. It depends on what counts as a characterization. I consider two quite di erent characterizations here. One is called frame distinguishability, and is very similar in spirit to the types of char-acterization considered in the economics literature. Not surprisingly, the results I obtain for frame distinguishability are quite similar to those obtained in the economics literature (and much the same techniques are used). In particular, I show that nite frames (essentially, nite spaces) that satisfy the CPA can be distinguished from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, there are no formulas in the language considered here that can distinguish in nite spaces satisfying the CPA from those that do not.
The second type of characterization I consider is that of nding a sound and complete axiomatization. I provide such an axiomatization; again, the key axiom involves disagreements in expectation. The same axiom system is shown to be sound and complete both in the nite and the in nite case. Thus, the distinction between nite and in nite spaces vanishes when we consider axiomatizations. Roughly speaking, this can be understood as saying that the language is too weak to distinguish nite from in nite spaces (despite being much stronger than that considered by Feinberg) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I carefully de ne the language considered and its semantics. In Section 3, I consider the two types of characterizations. I also consider what happens if the common knowledge operator is not in the language. In this case, I show that there are no new consequences of the CPA. This result is similar in spirit to, but di erent from, one of Lipman 1997] . Lipman showed that there are some (albeit weak) consequences of the CPA, even without common knowledge in the language. The di erences in our results are attributable to a small but signi cant di erence in our de nitions of the CPA in the case when there are information sets with prior probability 0; see Section 3 for details. I conclude in Section 4 with some discussion of these results. Most proofs can be found in the appendix.
Syntax and Semantics
To reason formally about knowledge and probability, the standard approach in the literature in philosophy and mathematics, which has also been adopted in computer science, starts with a language (the syntax). Of course, there is some exibility in exactly what language should be chosen. Since I want to reason about knowledge, common knowledge, and probability here, I use the syntax rst de ned in Fagin and Halpern 1994] , that lets us reason explicitly about all these notions.
Suppose we consider a system with n agents, say 1; : : : ; n, and we have a nonempty set of primitive propositions about which we wish to reason. (Think of these primitive propositions as representing basic events such as \agent 1 went left on his last move".) We take L K;C;pr n to be the least set of formulas that includes and is closed under the following construction rules: 1 If '; ' 0 ; ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m are formulas in L K;C;pr n , then so are :', '^' 0 , K i ', i = 1; : : : ; n, (which is read \agent i knows '"), C' (\' is common knowledge"), 1 Strictly speaking, I should write L K;C;pr n ( ), because is also a parameter of the language, just as n is. However, I omit it here, to simplify the notation. and a 1 pr i (' 1 ) + + a m pr i (' m ) > b, where a 1 ; : : : ; a m ; b are rational numbers, (pr i (') is read \the probability of ' according to agent i"). Let L K;pr n consist of all the formulas in L K;C;pr n that do not mention the C operator.
As usual, '_' 0 and ' ) ' 0 are abbreviations for :(:'^:' 0 ) and :'_' 0 , respectively.
In addition, E 1 ' (\everyone knows '") is an abbreviation for K 1 '^: : : K n ' and E m+1 ' is an abbreviation for E 1 E m ' (\everyone knows that everyone knows : : : that everyone knows|m + 1 times|'"), for m 1. Many other abbreviations will be used for reasoning about probability without further comment, such as pr i (') b for :(pr i (') > b), pr i (') b for ?pr i (') ?b, and pr i (') = b for pr i (') b^pr i (') b. Note that we can express simple conditional probabilities such as pr i ('j ) = 2=3 by clearing the denominator to get pr i ('^ ) = 2 3 pr i ( ). The operators K i and C allow us to reason about knowledge and common knowledge, respectively. Formulas such as a 1 pr i (' 1 ) + + a m pr i (' m ) > b are called i-probability formulas; they allow us to express a number of notions of interest.
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Note that by using i-probability formulas, we can also describe agent i's beliefs about the expected value of a random variable, provided that the worlds in which the random variable takes on a particular value can be characterized by formulas. For example, suppose that agent 1 wins $2 if a coin lands heads and loses $3 if it lands tails. Then the formula 2pr 1 (heads)? 3pr 1 (tails) > 1 says that agent 1 believes his expected winnings are at least $1. This is a much richer language for expressing an agent's beliefs than that used in the relevant literature in economics (for example, Feinberg 1996] ), although the belief indices of Bonanno and Nehring 1996] provide a semantic way of expressing yet richer notions.
To assign truth values to formulas in L K;C;pr n , we need a semantic model. The basic semantic model we use is a (Kripke) frame (for knowledge and probability for n agents). This is a tuple F = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ), where W is a set of possible worlds or states, K 1 ; : : : ; K n are equivalence relations on W, and PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n are probability assignments; PR i associates with each world w in W a probability space PR i (w) = (W w;i ; X w;i ; Pr w;i ). Intuitively, K i (w) = fw 0 : (w; w 0 ) 2 K i g is the set of worlds that agent i considers possible in world w and PR i (w) is the probability space that agent i uses at world w. PR i must satisfy the following three assumptions. A1. W w;i = K i (w): that is, the sample space at world w consists of the worlds that agent i considers possible at w. A2. If w 0 2 K i (w), then PR i (w) = PR i (w 0 ): at all worlds that agent i considers possible, he uses the same probability space. A3. X w;i , the set of measurable sets, includes K i (w)\K j (w 0 ) for each agent j and world w 0 2 K i (w). Intuitively, each agent's information partitions are measurable.
Apart from minor notational di erences, a Kripke frame is the standard model used in the economics literature to capture knowledge and probability (see, for example, Feinberg 1996]); K i (w) is usually called agent i's information set at world w. In the economics literature, an agent's knowledge is usually characterized by a partition, but this, of course, is equivalent to using an equivalence relation.
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I sometimes describe a relation K i by describing the partition it induces. A frame does not tell us how to connect the language to the worlds. For example, it does not tell us under what circumstances a primitive proposition p is true. To do that, we need an interpretation, that is, a function that associates with each primitive proposition an event, namely, the set of worlds where it is true. The traditional way of capturing this in the logic community is by taking to be a function that associates with each world w a truth assignment to the primitive propositions in ; i.e., , (w)(p) 2 ftrue; falseg for each primitive proposition p 2 and each world w 2 W. A (Kripke) structure (for knowledge and probability for n agents) is a tuple M = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ; ), where F = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ) is a frame and is an interpretation, with the restriction that We say that the structure M is based on the frame F. Note that there are many structures based on a frame F, one for each choice of interpretation. Kripke structures for knowledge and probability were rst considered in Fagin and Halpern 1994 ], but A1{A4 were not required in the basic framework. These four requirements correspond to the requirements denoted CONS (for consistency), SDP (for state-determined probability), and MEAS (for measurability) in Fagin and Halpern 1994] .
We can now associate an event with each formula in L K;C;pr n in a Kripke structure. We write (M; w) j = ' if the formula ' is true at world w in Kripke structure M; generalizing the earlier notation, we denote by '] ] M = fw : (M; w) j = 'g the event that ' is true in structure M. We proceed by induction on the structure of ', assuming that we have given the de nition for all subformulas ' 0 of ' and that ' 0 ] ] M \ K i (w) 2 X w;i ; that is, the event corresponding to each formula must be measurable. The clause for K i ' captures the intuition that K i ' is true at world w if ' is true all the worlds the agent considers possible at w, namely K i (w); the clause for C' enforces the intuition that common knowledge is equivalent to everyone knows, and everyone knows that everyone knows, : : : . Finally, the clause for i-probability formulas captures the intuition that a formula such as pr i (') + 2pr i ( ) > 1 just says that, according to agent i, the probability of ' plus twice the probability of is at least 1. It should be clear that this approach of starting with formulas and associating events with them is not so far removed from the more standard approach in the economics literature of de ning knowledge in terms of an operators K 1 ; : : : ; K n on events, where
For future reference, it is useful to recall a well-known alternative characterization of common knowledge. We say that world w 0 is reachable from w if there exist worlds w 0 ; : : : ; w m such that w = w 0 , w 0 = w m and for all k < m, there exists an agent j such that w k+1 2 K j (w k ). Let C(w) consist of all the worlds reachable from w; C(w) is called the component of w. This formalization of the CP is slightly di erent from the others in the literature. Bonanno and Nehring 1996], Feinberg 1996] , and Samet 1996] do not require the condition that the prior gives each component positive probability. However, this condition is necessary for Aumann's theorem to hold; see Example 2.3. Aumann 1976 Aumann , 1987 starts with the prior and assumes that the posteriors are obtained from the prior by conditioning on the information of the agents; in our language this means that Pr w;i is obtained from Pr W by conditioning on K i (w). In Aumann 1976 ], Aumann explicitly assumes that Pr W (K i (w)) 6 = 0 for all agents i and worlds w. (This assumption is also implicitly made in Aumann 1987] .) While the issue of what happens when the prior gives an information set zero probability is a relatively minor technical nuisance, it turns out to play an important role when considering the impact of the CPA. As mentioned in the Introduction, Lipman 1997] shows that there are still some consequences of the CPA even without common knowledge in the language. However, as shown here, the assumption that Pr W (K i (w)) 6 = 0 for all i; w is crucial for Lipman's results. With the weaker assumption that only components need get positive probability, there are in fact no consequences of the CPA without common knowledge in the language. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
The CPA is far from a weak assumption, as the following example shows.
Example 2.2: Consider the frame F 1 described in Figure 1 . There are four worlds; the partition induced by K 1 has the equivalence classes fw 1 ; w 2 g and fw 3 ; w 4 g, and the partition induced by K 2 has the equivalence classes fw 1 ; w 3 g and fw 2 ; w 4 g. Whatever two worlds agent 1 considers possible, he ascribes them both probability 1=2. Agent 2, however, thinks that w 3 is twice as likely w 1 and w 2 is twice as likely as w 4 . It is easy to see that F 1 cannot satisfy CP.
Let F n consist of all frames for n agents. Let F n n consist of all frames for n agents where the set of worlds is nite and the probability spaces at each point are such that every set is measurable. Let F CP n (resp., F CP; n n ) consist of all frames in F n (resp., F n n )
that satisfy CP. I use M n , M n n , M CP n , and M CP; n n to denote the corresponding sets of structures.
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A formula ' is valid (resp., satis ed) in a Kripke structure M = (W; : : :) if for all (resp., some) w 2 W, we have (M; w) j = '. A formula is valid (resp., satis ed) in frame F if it is valid in every Kripke structure (resp., satis ed in some Kripke structure) based 4 Technically, these are not sets but classes; they are too large to be sets. I ignore the distinction here. on F. A formula ' is valid in a set M of structures (resp., set F of frames) if it is valid in every structure M 2 M (resp., every frame F 2 F). It is easy to check that a formula is valid in a set F of frames i it is valid in the set M of all structures based on the frames in F.
To the extent that there has been consideration of formulas and structures that satisfy them in the economics literature, the focus has been on what has been called the canonical structure or canonical model. This is essentially a universal structure, which has the property that if a formula is satis able at all, it is satis ed at some world in the canonical structure. This was introduced in the economics literature by Aumann 1989] , although the basic idea is well known in the modal logic community, and seems to have been introduced independently by Kaplan 1966] , Makinson 1966] , and Lemmon and/or Scott Lemmon 1977] . Although it is true that every structure can in a precise sense be embedded in the canonical structure, the spaces of structures and frames introduced in the previous paragraph will play an important role in this paper. Aumann's 1976] abilities in the rst component. According to agent 1, w 1 gets probability 2=3 (so w 2 get probability 1=3); according to agent 2, w 1 and w 2 get equal probability. Suppose is such that p is true at w 1 and false at the other two worlds. Then it is easy to see that (M; w 1 ) j = C(pr 1 (p) = 2=3^pr 2 (p) = 1=2), so we have a disagreement in probability.
However, if we drop the requirement in CP that Pr W must give each component positive probability, then there would be a common prior in this case: it would assign w 3 probability 1 and the other two worlds probability 0.
3 Characterizing the CPA In this section, I consider two approaches to characterizing the CPA. The rst is in the spirit of the approaches taken in the economics literature (although it has analogues in the modal logic literature too), while the second involves nding a sound and complete axiomatization. In Section 4, I discuss in more detail what the de nitions tell us, in light of the results.
Frame Distinguishability
Frame distinguishability essentially asks whether there is a test (expressed as a set of formulas) that allows us to distinguish the frames satisfying a certain property from ones that do not.
De nition 3.1: A set A of formulas distinguishes a collection F of frames from another collection F 0 if (a) every formula in A is valid in F, (b) if F 2 F 0 , then some formula in A is not valid in F.
Typically the set A of formulas in De nition 3.1 consists of all instances of some axiom and the set F is the set of frames satisfying a certain property (like the CPA). Note that this de nition is given in terms of frames, not structures; as I show in the full paper, this is necessary for the technical results to hold. My results on frame distinguishability parallel those of Feinberg 1996]: we cannot distinguish frames that satisfy the CPA from those that do not, but we can distinguish nite frames satisfying the CPA from those that do not. To do this, we might hope to use the axiom characterizing Aumann's \no disagreement" theorem, :C(pr i (') = a^pr j (') = b) for a 6 = b. While this axiom in valid in F CP n (and hence F CP; n n ), it is not strong enough to distinguish F CP; n n from F n n ? F CP; n n . As Feinberg 1996] points out, there are frames in F n n ?F CP; n n that satisfy every instance of this axiom, simply because C(pr i (') = a) does not hold for any choice of a. For example, if we slightly modify the probabilities in the frame F 1 of Example 2.2 (for example, changing agent 2's probability so that the probability of w 3 is 2=3 + for some small (so that the probability of w 1 is 1=3 ? ), then the only formulas for which agent 2's probabilities are common knowledge are true and false. Thus, :C(pr 1 (') = a^pr 2 (') = b) for a 6 = b trivially holds. It follows that we need something stronger than disagreement in probability to characterize the CPA.
Consider the following axiom.
CP 2 . If ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m are mutually exclusive formulas (that is, if :(' i^'j ) is an instance of a propositional tautology for i 6 = j), then :C(a 1 pr 1 (' 1 ) + + a m pr 1 (' m ) > 0^a 1 pr 2 (' 1 ) + + a m pr 2 (' m ) < 0):
Notice that CP 2 is really an axiom scheme; that is, it represents a set of formulas, obtained by considering all instantiations of a 1 ; : : : ; a m and ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m . CP 2 is valid in a structure M if it is not common knowledge that agents 1 and 2 disagree about the expected value of the random variable which takes value a j on ' j ] ] M , j = 1; : : : ; m. Intuitively, CP 2 says that it cannot be common knowledge that agents 1 and 2 have a disagreement in expectation. It is easy to see that disagreements in expectation cannot exist if there is a common prior; Feinberg 1995 Feinberg , 1996 and Samet 1996] showed that the converse also holds in nite spaces.
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The following theorem just recasts their results in this framework; its proof shows why we need to use frames rather than structures in De nition 3.1. It is easy to see that CP 2 is equivalent to the axiom that results from CP n above when n = 2, so I take the liberty of abusing notation and denoting both as CP 2 .
The following result generalizes Theorem 3.2; its proof is omitted, since it follows from results of Feinberg and Samet in the same way as Theorem 3.2. Theorem 3.3: CP n distinguishes F CP; n n from F n n ? F CP; n n , for all n 2.
What happens if the set of worlds is not nite? Feinberg shows by example that we can nd structures for which there is no common prior, and yet there is no disagreement in expectation (at least, not by bounded random variables). His counterexample can also be used to show that CP 2 does not distinguish F CP 2 from F 2 ? F CP 2 . I give his counterexample here (actually, a simpli cation of it, which su ces for my purposes), since it will be needed to prove the next theorem.
Example 3.4: Let F = (W; K 1 ; K 2 ; PR 1 ; PR 2 ) be the frame described in Figure 3 : W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; : : :g; K 1 induces the partition ffw 1 g; fw 2 ; w 3 g; fw 4 ; w 5 g; : : :g and K 2 induces the partition ffw 1 ; w 2 g; fw 3 ; w 4 g; : : :g; PR 1 and PR 2 are as described in the gure.
As the gure shows, both agents think that all the worlds they consider possible at each world are equally likely (which means that they have probability 1=2 except in the case of agent 1 at worlds w 1 ).
It is easy to see that there is no common prior in F . For suppose that Pr W is such a common prior. To get all the conditional probabilities to work out, we must have Pr W (w 1 ) = Pr W (w 2 ) = Pr W (w 3 ) = : : :, and this is clearly impossible; there is no uniform distribution on a countable set.
On the other hand, suppose that there exist mutually exclusive formulas ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m such that C 1 (a 1 pr 1 (' 1 ) + + a m pr 1 (' m ; that is the subject of the next section.
A Sound and Complete Axiomatization of the CPA
The more standard approach to characterizing a notion like the CPA in the logic community is via a sound and complete axiomatization. An axiom system AX consists of a collection of axioms and inference rules. An axiom is a formula, and an inference rule has the form \from ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k infer ," where ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k ; are formulas. Typically (and, in particular, in this paper), the axioms are all instances of axiom schemes. Thus, for example, an axiom scheme such as K i ' ) ' de nes an in nite collection of axioms, one for each choice of '. A proof in AX consists of a sequence of formulas, each of which is either an axiom in AX or follows by an application of an inference rule. A proof is said to be a proof of the formula ' if the last formula in the proof is '. We say ' is provable in AX, and write AX`', if there is a proof of ' in AX; similarly, we say that ' is consistent with AX if :' is not provable in AX. An axiom system AX is said to be sound for a language L with respect to a set M of structures if every formula in L provable in AX is valid with respect to every structure in M. The system AX is complete for L with respect to M if every formula in L that is valid with respect to every structure in M is provable in AX. We think of AX as characterizing the class M if it provides a sound and complete axiomatization of that class. Soundness and completeness provide a connection between the syntactic notion of provability and the semantic notion of validity. In Fagin and Halpern 1994] , a complete axiomatization is provided for the language L K;pr n with respect M n . The axiom system can be modularized into ve components: axioms for propositional reasoning, axioms for reasoning about knowledge, axioms for reasoning about linear inequalities (since i-probability formulas are basically linear inequalities), axioms for reasoning about probability, and axioms for combined reasoning about knowledge and probability, forced by assumptions A1 and A2. Let AX K;pr n consist of the following axioms and inference rules, where i 2 f1; : : : ; ng: I. Propositional Reasoning Prop. All instances of propositional tautologies R1. From ' and ' ) infer II. Reasoning About Knowledge K1. ( V. Reasoning about knowledge and probabilities KP1. K i (') ) pr i (') = 1 KP2. ' ) K i ', if ' is an i-probability formula or the negation of an i-probability formula.
The axioms and rules for propositional reasoning and reasoning about knowledge together give the standard complete axiomatization for knowledge Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] . The axioms and rules for reasoning about inequalities and reasoning about probability are taken from Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990] , where it is shown that, together with the the propositional component, they give a complete axiomatization 8 In Fagin and Halpern 1994] , this inference rule is stated as the axiom pr i (') = pr i ( ) if ' , is a propositional tautology. We need the more general inference rule to prove, for example, that pr i (K j ') = pr i (K j K j ').
for reasoning about probability. Note that P3 essentially captures nite additivity. Although our probability measures are countably additive, there is no axiom for countable additivity. This is essentially because the language is too weak to capture this inherently in nitary property. What happens when we add common knowledge to the language? It is well known Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern and Moses 1992] that adding the following to the axioms and rules for knowledge gives a complete axiomatization for the language of knowledge and common knowledge: 9 VI. Reasoning About Common Knowledge C1. C' , E('^C') RC. From ' ) E('^ ) infer ' ) C Let AX K;C;pr n be the system consisting of the axioms and rules of AX K;pr n together with C1 and RC. Theorem 3.6: AX K;C;pr n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;C;pr n with respect to both M n and M n n (and hence also with respect to both F n and F n n ).
Proof: The proof is a straightforward (although lengthy and tedious) combination of the techniques of Fagin and Halpern 1994] and Halpern and Moses 1992] . The result is actually proved in the course of proving Theorem 3.8.
is not a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;C;pr n with respect to M CP n and M CP; n n . If we restrict to structures that satisfy the CPA, we get new valid formulas.
Indeed, as we have already seen, every instance of CP n is valid in M CP n (and hence M CP; n n ). In light of Theorem 3.3, we might hope that if we add CP n to AX K;C;pr n , this would give us a sound and complete axiomatization, at least for M CP; n n . Unfortunately, this is not the case.
To understand why, some background is helpful. Samet 1996] shows that, given a frame, the set of possible priors for agent i (i.e., those that can generate the posteriors de ned by Pr w;i ) forms a closed convex set. If two agents do not have common prior, the corresponding sets of possible priors must be disjoint. He then makes use of a standard result of convex analysis Rockafellar 1972 ] to conclude that these sets can be strictly separated by a hyperplane. The separating hyperplane gives the coe cients a 1 ; : : : ; a m in CP 2 . That is, strict separation by a hyperplane amounts to a disagreement in expectation.
If we consider the set of priors compatible with a given formula, it is no longer necessarily a closed set, so Samet's argument does not quite work. For example, let ' 1 , ' 2 , and ' 3 be the three mutually exclusive formulas p^q, p^:q, and :p, respectively. Let 1 be (pr 1 (' 1 ) > pr 1 (' 2 )) _ ((pr 1 (' 1 ) = pr 1 (' 2 ))^(pr 1 (' 3 ) > 1=2)) and 2 be (pr 2 (' 1 ) < pr 2 (' 2 )) _ ((pr 2 (' 1 ) = pr 2 (' 2 ))^(pr 2 (' 3 ) 1=2)).
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Let X i consist of all prior probability distributions for agent i that satisfy i , i = 1; 2. Then X 1 = f(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) : x 1 > x 2 or x 1 = x 2 ; x 3 > 1=2g (where x i is the probability of ' i , i = 1; 2; 3) and X 2 = f(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) : x 1 < x 2 or x 1 = x 2 ; x 3 1=2g. X 1 and X 2 are easily seen to be disjoint. Thus, there cannot be a common prior. However, although X 1 and X 2 are convex, they are not closed; it is easy to show that they cannot be strictly separated by a hyperplane, and we do not have disagreement in expectation in the spirit of CP 2 . As a consequence, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7: The formula :C( 1^ 2 ) is valid in M CP 2 , but is not provable in the system AX K;C;pr 2 + CP 2 .
It follows from Theorem 3.7 that, if we are to obtain a completeness result, even in the case of two agents, we need something stronger than CP 2 . The key insight comes from examining the set X Although CP 0 n is not as elegant as we might hope, it does the job. Let AX CP n consist of all the axioms and rules of AX K;C;pr n together with CP 0 n .
Theorem 3.8: AX CP n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;C;pr n with respect to both M CP n and M CP; n n (and hence also with respect to both F CP n and F CP; n n ).
Proof: See the appendix.
It may seem somewhat surprising that there is no di erence between in nite structure and nite structures in Theorem 3.8. The contrast with Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 is striking; they show that there is a big distinction between nite and in nite frames when we try to characterize the CPA in terms of frame distinguishability. The key point is that, although this language is quite expressive in some ways, it is not expressive enough to distinguish nite structures from in nite ones. This is made precise in the following theorem, which shows that if a formula is satis able at all, it is satis ed in a nite structure. The result actually follows from the proof of Theorem 3.8, but I provide in the appendix an alternative proof, using a standard proof technique for proving such results from the modal logic literature known as ltration. Theorem 3.9: A formula in L K;C;pr n is valid with respect to M CP n (resp., M n ) i it is valid with respect to M CP; n n (resp., M n n ).
Restricting the Language to L K;pr n
What happens if we drop the common knowledge operator from the language? As I mentioned earlier, it is shown in Fagin and Halpern 1994] that AX K;pr n provides a sound and complete axiomatization for the language L K;pr n with respect to M n . Here, I show that it is also a complete axiomatization for the language L K;pr n with respect to M CP n . That is, there are no new consequences in the languages L K;pr n that follow from CP.
Moreover, restricting to nite structures does not change anything. Theorem 3.10: AX K;pr n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;pr n with respect to both M CP n and M CP; n n (and hence also with respect to both F CP n and F CP; n n ).
We do no better with frame distinguishability. Of course, we already know from Theorem 3.5 that formulas in L K;C;pr n cannot distinguish arbitrary (in nite) frames satisfying the CPA from ones that do not. But Theorem 3.3 tells us that we can distinguish nite frames satisfying the CPA from ones that do not, using formulas that involve common knowledge. It is almost immediate from Theorem 3.10 that this use of common knowledge is necessary.
Theorem 3.11: For all n, no set A of formulas in L K;pr n distinguishes F CP; n n from F n n ? F CP; n n .
These results stand in distinction to those proved by Lipman 1997] . Lipman showed that there are consequences of the CPA (given his formalization of it) even without common knowledge in the language. In particular, shows that agents' belief must be weakly consistent in the sense that it is impossible for agents to have false beliefs. For example, given his formalization of the CPA, it is impossible for agent 1 to ascribe positive probability to the event that p is true but agent 2 ascribing probability 0 to it. That is, pr 1 (p^pr 2 (p) = 0) > 0 is inconsistent.
Note that this formula is consistent in M CP 2 . Consider the structure described in Figure 4 . There are two worlds, w 1 and w 2 . Agent 2 cannot distinguish them while agent 1 can (so agent 2's partition has one equivalence class|fw 1 ; w 2 g|while agent 1's has two|fw 1 g and fw 2 g). Agent 2 ascribes probability 1 to w 2 and probability 0 to w 1 . Obviously, agent 1's probability at w 1 and w 2 is determined. If p is true at w 1 and false at w 2 , then clearly pr 1 (p^pr 2 (p) = 0) = 1 is true at w 1 . Moreover, this structure satis es CP; we can take the prior to agree with agent 2's probability measure. Notice that the common prior assigns K 1 (w 1 ) probability 0. denote the sets of frames (resp., nite frames, structures, nite structures) for n agents that satisfy CP s .
Lipman's results characterizing the consequences of CP s in the language L K;pr n can be viewed, in terms of the framework here, as a combination of results regarding axiomatizations and frame distinguishability. I brie y review his results here (translated to this framework).
Lipman rst shows that the language L K;pr n cannot distinguish structures satisfying CP s from those satisfying the weaker common support assumption. A structure M = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ; ) satis es the common support assumption if it satis es the following condition:
CS. For all worlds w 2 W, agents i; j, and events E K i (w) \ K j (w), if Pr w;i (E) = 0 then Pr w;j (E) = 0.
Let F CS n (resp., F CS; n n ) consist of those frames in F n (resp., F n n ) that satisfy CS. CS is clearly weaker than CP s (i.e., F CP s n F CS n ). Intuitively, it holds as long as i and j's priors assign probability 0 to the same events, and does not require that they assign the same probability to all events. However, Lipman shows that the same formulas in L K;pr n are valid in both sets of structures.
Theorem 3.12: Lipman 1997] For all ' 2 L K;pr n , we have F CS n j = ' i F CP s n j = '.
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Lipman further shows that weak consistency distinguishes frames satisfying CS from those that do not. More precisely, consider the following axiom:
WC. pr i ('^pr j (') = 0) = 0 Theorem 3.13: Lipman 1997 ] WC distinguishes F CS n from F n ? F CS n .
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We might at rst think that it follows from Theorems 3.12 and 3.13 that WC distinguishes frames satisfying CP s from those that do not, but it is easy to see that this is not true. It is trivial to construct a 2-world frame that satis es WC but does not satisfy 11 Actually, Lipman proves this result only for countable frames. Since, by using the techniques of Theorem 3.9, we can show that a formula is satis ed in F CS n (resp., F CP s n ) i it is satis ed in F CS; n n (resp., F CP s ; n n ), the result holds for arbitrary frames as well. 12 Lipman actually considers structures rather than frames and imposes an additional condition he calls nonredudancy, which, roughly speaking, says that any two worlds are distinguishable by some formula. By working at the level of frames, we avoid the need for the nonredundancy condition. CP s . In fact, I conjecture that there are no formulas in L K;pr n that can distinguish frames satisfying CP s from ones that do not, although I have not proved this.
What happens when we add common knowledge to the language again? I have not examined this situation in detail, although I conjecture that analogues to Theorems 3.3, 3.5, and 3.8 hold. Note, however, that we need something stronger than CP n together with WC to distinguish nite frames satisfying CP s from those that do not, as the following example shows.
Example 3.14: Consider the structure M described in Figure 5 . There are four worlds, fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g. Agent 1's partition is fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g and fw 4 g, while agent 2's is fw 1 ; w 2 g. M clearly satis es CS, since both agents agree that w 3 gets probability 0. It also satis es CP, since there is a common prior which gives w 4 probability 1. However, it does not satisfy CP s : There can be no common prior that gives fw 1 ; w 2 g positive probability.
Since M satis es CS and CP, it satis es all instances of CP 2 (in fact, CP 0 2 ) and WC. Thus, these formulas cannot distinguish even nite frames satisfying CP s from ones that do not.
The following strengthening of CP 2 is valid in F CP s n (and not in the frame of Example 3.14):
Discussion
In this paper, I have considered two di erent ways of characterizing the CPA|by frame distinguishability and by complete axiomatizations. The notion of frame distinguishability is closer to the notions typically used in the economics community. If F can be distinguished from F 0 , that amounts to saying that we have a test that can distinguish frames in F from those in F 0 . That is analogous to saying that we have a test that distinguishes gold from bronze. Clearly, whether or not we have a distinguishing test depends on how sharp our tools are. In this context, \sharpness of tools" amounts to the expressive power of the language.
Having a test that distinguishes gold from bronze does not mean we have a complete characterization of the properties of gold. But what is a \complete characterization" of gold? Does it su ce to talk about its molecular structure, or do we also have to mention its color and the fact that it glitters in the sun? It should be clear that the notion of \complete characterization" is language dependent. We have a complete characterization of gold in a given language L if we can describe everything that can be said about gold in L. In general, having a complete characterization in one language tells us nothing about getting a characterization in a richer language. For example, if we have a weak language, it may be easy to nd a complete characterization, because there are not many interesting properties of gold in that language. That does not give us any hint of what would constitute a complete characterization in a richer language. (By way of contrast, if we have a distinguishing test in one language, the same test works for any more powerful language.)
We observed this phenomenon with the CPA: in the language L K;pr n , there is nothing interesting we can say about the CPA. There are no new axioms over and above the axioms for reasoning about knowledge and probability in all structures (Theorem 3.10). Once we add common knowledge to the language, there are a great many more interesting things that can be said about (structures satisfying) the CPA.
For similar reasons, we may be able to completely characterize a notion without being able to distinguish frames that satisfy it from ones that do not. The fact that the language is not rich enough to provide a distinguishing test does not mean we cannot completely characterize all the properties of a notion of interest in that language. Again, we saw this phenomenon with the CPA. We can completely characterize the CPA in the language L K;pr n (in a not particularly interesting way, as Theorem 3.10 shows), although L K;pr n is of no help in providing tests to distinguish frames satisfying the CPA from ones that do not (Theorem 3.11). If we add common knowledge to the language, then we can distinguish nite frames satisfying the CPA from ones that do not (Theorem 3.3|this is essentially the result proved by Feinberg, Samet, and Bonanno and Nehring) , but cannot distinguish in nite frames satisfying the CPA from those that do not (Theorem 3.5); nevertheless, we can completely characterize the properties of ( nite or in nite) frames satisfying the CPA (Theorem 3.8).
This leads to both a technical question and a pragmatic one. The technical question is whether, in a su ciently rich language, the agents can distinguish in nite frames satisfying the CPA from ones that do not (given only their posterior information). I leave this question open. The pragmatic question is which of the two notions I have considered is more appropriate. That, of course, depends on the application. If we are interested in knowing if we can test whether or not the CPA holds in a given structure, this is a question essentially about frame distinguishability. On the other hand, if we are interested in knowing what properties hold in a given situation, given a nite collection of facts about the agents' knowledge and beliefs and about the true situation (all expressed as formulas in L K;C;pr n ) and that the CPA holds, this is a question that can be answered using a complete axiomatization|frame distinguishability is of no help. Although both notions are useful, it is helpful to be clear about the di erences between them. This paper attempts to provide some clari cation.
A Appendix: Proofs
The order of proofs here is di erent from the order in which the results are stated in the main text, since some of the earlier theorems (particularly Theorem 3.5) depend on some of the later results. The statements are repeated for the convenience of the reader. where each q i is either p i or :p i . We can then de ne a structure M based on F with an interpretation such that ' j ] ] M = fw j g, j = 1; : : : ; N. Taking a j = X(w j ), j = 1; : : : ; m, then C(a 1 pr 1 (' 1 ) + + a N pr 1 (' 1 ) > 0^a 1 pr 2 (' 1 ) + + a N pr 2 (' 1 ) < 0) is satis ed (in fact, valid) in M.
Note that this proof crucially depended on being able to de ne an interpretation appropriately. This is why frames frames rather than structures are used in De nition 3.1.
As I said earlier, I defer the proof of Theorem 3.5 until after that of Theorem 3.8, continuing instead with the proof of Theorem 3.7.
Proof: First I show that :C( 1^ 2 ) is valid in M CP 2 . Suppose that (M; w) j = C( 1^ 2 ) for some M 2 M CP 2 . Let Pr W be the common prior in M, let W 1 be the set of worlds in C(w) where pr 1 (' 1 ) > pr 1 (' 2 ) is satis ed, let W 2 be the set of worlds in C(w) where pr 2 (' 1 ) < pr 2 (' 2 ) is satis ed, and let W 3 be the set of worlds in C(w) where pr 1 (' 1 ) = pr 1 (' 2 )^pr 2 (' 1 ) = pr 2 (' 2 ) is satis ed. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, let U 1 ; : : : ; U m be a partition of C(w) into sets the form K i (w 0 I shall prove Claim A.1 shortly; rst I show why it su ces to prove the theorem.
Suppose there is a proof of :C( 1^ 2 ) in the system AX K;C;pr + CP 2 . By de nition, this means there is a sequence of formulas ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m , each of which is an axiom of AX K;C;pr + CP 2 or follows from previous steps by an appplication of an inference rule, such that ' m = :C( 1^ 2 ). Let be the minimum of for all instances of CP 2 that arise in ' 1 ; : : : ; ' m . It is easy to see that each formula ' i , i = 1; : : : ; m is valid in M~x if jx?(1=4; 1=4; 1=2)j < : Each formula ' j that is an instance of an axiom other than CP 2 is valid in every structure; if ' j is an instance of CP 2 , this follows from Claim A.1 and the choice of ; and if ' j follows from previous formulas by application of an inference rule, this follows since inference rules preserve validity if the formulas they are being applied to are valid. In particular, ' m = :C( 1^ 2 ) is valid in every structure M~x such that jx ? (1=4; 1=4; 1=2)j < . But this contradicts the fact that C( 1^ 2 ) is valid in every structure in M, by choice of M. , it seems clear that making only slight changes to agent 1's probability shouldn't a ect the validity of . This intuition is in fact true; however, there is one subtlety involved in proving it: We must show that the event corresponding to j does not change as a result of small changes in the probability. This is the content of the next claim, which says that we can partition the set of structure M~x into convex regions over which the event corresponding to a given formula is constant. Proof: This result follows easily by induction on the struture of '. If ' is a primitive proposition, then we can take ' = f 3 g; for example, p] ] Mx = fw 1 ; w 2 g for allx 2 3 . We can take :' = K i ' = C' = ' and take '^ = fA \ B : A 2 ' ; B 2 g. The expression in (1) is actually an expression in a formal language for reasoning about linear inequalities introduced in Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990] . Since this will come up again later, it is worth making it a little more precise now. Suppose that we start with a xed in nite set of variables. A basic inequality formula is one of the form a 1 x 1 + + a k x k > b, where a 1 ; : : : ; a k ; b are rational numbers and x 1 ; : : : ; x k are variables. For example, 2x 1 ?x 2 > 3 is a basic inequality formula. An inequality formula is a Boolean combination of basic inequality formulas. An assignment (to variables) is a function A that assigns a real number to every variable. We de ne A j = a 1 x 1 + + a k x k > b i a 1 A(x 1 ) + + a k A(x k ) > b: We then extend j = to arbitrary inequality formulas, which are just Boolean combinations of basic inequality formulas, in the obvious way, namely A j = :f i A 6 j = f A j = f^g i A j = f and A j = g:
As usual we say an inequality formula f is valid if A j = f for all A that are assignments to variables. If f is a valid inequality and we obtain a formula in L K;pr n by replacing the variables in f by probability terms of the form pr i (') (replacing each occurrence of a variable x j by the same probability term), then the resulting formula is clearly also valid in M n . Moreover, as shown in Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990] , it is provable using just the axioms I1{I6 for reasoning about linear inequalities and propositional reasoning (Prop and R1). This fact will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Continuing with the main line of our proof, Samet 1996] shows how to generalize the special case of Lemma A.3 where X 1 and X 2 are closed convex sets to the case of n sets. The following result is the analogous generalization here. I omit the proof, since it proceeds in much the same spirit as Samet's, using the ideas of Lemma A.3. Lemma A.4: Suppose that X 1 ; : : : ; X n are convex (but not necessarily closed) subsets of m such that \ n i=1 X i = ;. Then, for some h m ? 1, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, and vectors ã ik , i = 1; : : : ; n, k = 1; : : : ; h, such that P n i=1ã ik =0, for k = 1; : : : ; h, for allx i 2 X i , i = 1; : : : ; n, we have V n i=1ã i1 x i 0^( V n i=1ã i1 x i = 0 )
: : :( V n i=1ã i(h?1) x i 0^( V n i=1 (ã i(h?1) x i = 0 ) (ã i h x i > 0^V i6 =i ã i(h?1) x i 0))) : : :): (2) Moreover, if the sets X i , i = 1; : : : ; n, are each de ned by a nite collection of linear equations and inequalities with rational coe cients, the coordinates ofã ik can all be taken to be rational.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.8: AX CP n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;C;pr n with respect to both M CP n and M CP; n n (and hence also both F CP n and F CP; n n ).
Proof: The completeness proof follows closely along the lines of the completeness proof given in Fagin and Halpern 1994 ] (which in turn uses a combination of techniques from Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990; Halpern and Moses 1992; Makinson 1966] ), which shows that AX K;pr n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;pr n with respect to M n .
The added complications in this proof are dealing with the fact we have common knowledge in the language and with CP. The techniques for dealing with common knowledge are well known Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern and Moses 1992] , so I focus here on dealing with CP.
We want to show that if ' 2 L K;C;pr n is valid with respect to M CP; n n , then it is provable in AX CP n . Equivalently, we must show if ' is consistent with AX CP n , then ' is satis ed in some structure in M CP; n n . The proof actually shows how to construct such a structure.
Let Sub(') be the set of all subformulas of ' and let Sub + (') be the set of subformulas of ' and their negations.
If w is a nite set of formulas, let ' w be the conjunction of the formulas in w. The set w is a maximal consistent subset of Sub + (') if w Sub + ('), ' w is consistent with M CP; n n , and for every subformula of ', either or : is in w. (Note that w cannot include both and : , for then ' w would not be consistent.) Following Makinson 1966 ] (see also Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern and Moses 1992] ), we rst construct a Kripke structure for knowledge (but not probability) (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; ) as follows: we take W, the set of worlds, to consist of all maximal consistent subsets of Sub + ('). If u and v are worlds, then (u; v) 2 K i precisely if u and v contain the same formulas of the form C , K i , and pr i ( 1 ) + + pr i ( k ) > b. We de ne so that for a primitive proposition p, we have (s)(p) = true i p is one of the formulas in the set s. Our goal is to de ne a probability assignments PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n such that M = (S; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ; ) 2 M CP n (in fact, it will be in M CP; n n , since W is clearly nite) and, moreover, for every world w 2 W and every formula 2 Sub + ('), we have (M; w) j = i 2 w. ( ) Since ' is consistent, we must have ' 2 w for some w 2 W. Hence, once we show that there exist PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n such that M satis es (*), we are done.
It is easy to see that the formulas ' w are mutually exclusive for w 2 W. Moreover, we can show that AX CP n` , _ fv2W j 2vg ' v , for all 2 Sub + ('). Using these observations, we can show, using P1{P3 and RP (and propositional reasoning, i.e., Prop and R1) that AX CP n`p r i ( ) = P fv2W j 2vg pr i (' v ) (cf. Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990, Lemma 2.3] ). Using this fact together with I1 and I3, we can show that an i-probability formula 2 Sub + (') is provably equivalent to a formula of the form P v2W c v i (' v ) > b, for some appropriate coe cients c v .
For each world u and agent i, we associate a set L ui of linear equalities and inequalities over variables of the form x iv , for v 2 K i (u). We can think of x iv as representing Pr u;i (v),
i.e., the probability of world v under agent i's probability distribution at world u. We have one inequality in L ui corresponding to every i-probability formula in Sub
Assume that is equivalent to P Finally, we add to L ui the equality X v2K i (u) x iv = 1:
Note that if u 0 2 K i (u), then L u 0 i = L ui , since the set of i-probability formulas in u and u 0 is the same.
As shown in Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990, Theorem 2.2] , since ' u is consistent, there exists a probability measure Pr u;i satisfying (the equation and inequalities in) L ui (taking x iv = Pr u;i (v)). If we were not concerned with CP, then we could just de ne PR i so that Pr u;i = Pr u;i . Since L u 0 i = L ui for u 0 2 K i (u), we could also assume without loss of generality that Pr u;i = Pr u 0 ;i for u 0 2 K i (u). The techniques of Fagin and Halpern 1994] and ( Halpern and Moses 1992] in the case of common knowledge) then show that (*) holds for the resulting Kripke structure. I do not repeat the argument here. This actually gives us the proof of Theorem 3.6. However, these probability assignments do not necessarily satisfy CP, so we are not done yet.
Note we can identify a probability measure on W with an element of jWj . We can thus use the tuple hx v : v 2 Wi to denote a generic probability measure on W. We say that a probability measure Pr = hx v : v 2 Wi is compatible with L ui if Pr( jK i (u)) satis es L ui as long as Pr(K i (u)) 6 = 0. (More precisely, as long as the tuple hx iv : v 2 K i (v)i satis es L ui , where x iv = x v = Pr(K i (u)).) Let X i consist of all the probabilities measures on W compatible with L ui for all u 2 W. If \ n i=1 X i 6 = ;, then we are done: Choose Pr 2 \ n i=1 X i , and de ne PR i so that Pr u;i = Pr( jK i (u)) if Pr(K i (u)) 6 = 0 and Pr u;i is some arbitrary probability measure satisfying L ui if Pr(K i (u)) = 0. As I mentioned above, with this choice of PR i , (*) holds. Now suppose, by way of contradiction, that \ n i=1 X i = ;. Since X 1 ; : : : ; X n are de ned by linear equations and inequalities with rational coe cients, by Lemma A.4, there exist h jWj, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, and vectorsã ik , i = 1; : : : ; n, k = 1; : : : ; h, satisfying (2) (from Lemma A.4) such that the coordinates ofã ik are all rational. Denote by f the inequality formula obtained by using these particular vectorsã ik in (2) 
(In fact, all we need for this proof are the axioms for reasoning knowledge and common knowledge; the axioms for probability and inequalities play no role.) Moreover, using (3), Prop, K1, R1, and R2, it is straightforward to show that
From (4), (5), and propositional reasoning, we get that
Thus, from (6) and RC, we have that
Propositional reasoning and (7) tells us that
for all w 2 W. But note that C( ) is the negation of an instance of CP 0 n . This says that w is inconsistent, for each w 2 W. But this contradicts the assumption that w is a (maximal) consistent set.
This contradiction completes the proof, since it shows that \ n i=1 X i 6 = ;.
Using Theorem 3.8, we can now prove Theorem 3.5. it is straightforward to show that every instance of CP 0 k is valid in F k . This su ces for the proof, just as in the case k = 2. Theorem 3.9: A formula in L K;C;pr is valid with respect to M CP n (resp., M n ) i it is valid with respect to M CP; n n (resp., M n n ).
Proof: I start by considering the the case of M CP n and M CP; n n . Clearly if ' is valid with respect to M CP n , it is also valid with respect to M CP; n n . For the converse, it su ces to show that if ' is satis ed in M CP n , then it is satis ed in M CP; n n ; that is, if ' is satis able at all, it is satis ed in a nite structure. This follows from Theorem 3.8 and its proof.
If ' is satis ed in M CP n then, by Theorem 3.8, ' must be consistent with AX CP n . The proof of Theorem 3.8 then shows how to construct a structure in M CP; n n satisfying '.
(In fact, the structure has at most 2 j'j worlds, where j'j is the length of ', viewed as a string of symbols, since it is not hard to show by induction on j'j that jSub(')j j'j).
I provide an alternate proof of this result here, since it gives further insight into what is going on.
Suppose that ' is satis ed in some structure M = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ; ) 2 M CP n . Since M 2 M CP n , there is some probability Pr W on W as required by CP. De ne an equivalence relation on the worlds in M by taking w w 0 if w and w 0 agree on all formulas in Sub('). That is, if (M; w) j = i (M; w 0 ) j = for all 2 Sub('). Let w] be the equivalence class of w according to ; that is, w] = fw 0 : w w 0 g. Note that there are at most 2 jSub(')j ( 2 j'j ) equivalence classes. The argument in the case of M n and M n n is almost identical, and is also left to the reader. Theorem 3.10: AX K;pr n is a sound and complete axiomatization for L K;pr n with respect to both M CP n and M CP; n n (and hence also both F CP n and F CP; n n ).
Proof: Clearly AX K;pr n is sound with respect to M CP n and M CP; n n , since it is already sound with respect to M n . We want to show that every formula in L K;pr n that is valid in M CP n (resp., M CP; n n ) is provable in AX K;pr n . As in the proof of Theorem 3.8, it su ces to show that every formula in L K;pr n consistent with AX K;pr n is satis ed in some structure in M CP; n n . Since AX K;pr n is complete with respect to M n , we know that every formula consistent with AX K;pr n is satis ed in some structure in M n . By Theorem 3.9, we can assume without loss of generality it is satis ed in a structure in M n n . Thus, it su ces to show that every formula that is satis ed in some structure in M n n is also satis ed in The proof depends on two key observations, which I state informally here and then make more precise.
1. If a formula ' 0 2 L K;pr n is satis able at all, it is satis ed at the root of a \treelike" structure of height at most d(' 0 ). 2. Adding worlds to the leaves of this treelike structure that are \distance" greater than d(' 0 ) away from the root does not a ect the truth of ' 0 at the root.
To make this precise, I use a standard idea from modal logic of \unwinding" a structure to a tree. Given a structure M = (W; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR n ; ) 2 M n n , we de ne a \treelike" structure T M;w;k , for each world w 2 W and k 0, such that (T M;w;k ; r) k (M; w), where r is the \root" of T M;w;k , as follows: The rst step is to de ne (rooted, labeled, directed) trees T M;w;k , by induction on k. The tree T M;w;0 just consists of a single node r, labeled w. (In general, nodes will be labeled by worlds in W, but more than one node may be labeled with the same world, and edges will be labeled by agents.) T M;w;k+1 consists of a root node r labeled by w and, for each agent i and world w 0 6 = w such w 0 2 K i (w), a directed edges labeled by i leading from r to the root r 0 of T i M;w;k , where T i M;w;k is the result of removing all the i-successors of r 0 in T M;w 0 ;k (and all the nodes reachable from these i-successors). We can easily show by induction on k that this construction guarantees that there is no path in T M;w;k+1 that contains two consecutive i-edges, for any agent i. (n 0 ); 2 K M;w;k i (n) ; Pr n;i ), where if n is not a leaf in T M;w;k or if n is a leaf in T M;w;k and is the i-successor of some (non-leaf) node, then for all n 0 2 K M;w;k i (n), we have Pr n;i (n 0 ) = Pr f(n);i (f(n 0 )), where f is the function that associates with each node in T M;w;k the world that labels it; if n is a leaf in T M;w;k and is not the i-successor of some non-leaf node, then Pr n;i (n) = 1. (In this case, it is easy to see that K M;w;k i (n) = fng.) M;w;k (n)(p) = (f(n))(p).
It is easy to check that Pr n;i is indeed a probability measure on K M;w;k i (n) for each agent i and n 2 W M;w;k .
Lemma A.5: (M; w) k (T M;w;k ; r), where r is the root of T M;w;k .
Proof: For each node n 2 W M;w;k , let dist(r; n) be the distance from r to n in T M;w;k .
A straightforward induction on d( ), which I leave to the reader, can be used to show that if d( ) + dist(r; n) k, then (T M;w;k ; n) j = i (M; f(n)) j = . Since d(r; r) = 0 and f(r) = w, this gives us the desired result.
Lemma A.5 actually shows proves both of the informal observations above. It shows that if a formula ' 0 is satis able at all, it is satis ed in a treelike structure of height at most d(' 0 ), since if ' 0 is satis ed at the situation (M; w), then T M;w;k is the required treelike structure. Moreover, it shows that making changes in this treelike structure by adding worlds to leaves does not a ect the truth of ' 0 , since if M 0 is the resulting structure, we will still have T M;w;k = T M 0 ;w;k . The remainder of the argument uses this second point (and makes it more precise).
Let n be a leaf of T M;w;k and suppose that n is the i-successor of some node n 0 . We construct a structure M that is almost identical to T M;w;k . Informally, we add a new world n which is the i 0 -successor of n for some i 0 6 = i, and assume that all agents assign n probability 1. More precisely, let M = (W ; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ; PR 1 ; : : : ; PR m ; ), where W = W M;w;k fn g, K j = K M;w;k j f(n ; n )g for j 6 = i 0 ; K i 0 = K M;w;k i f(n; n ); (n ; n); (n ; n )g, PR j (n 0 ) = (K j (n 0 ); 2 K j (n 0 ) ; Pr n 0 ;j ), where Pr n 0 ;j = Pr n 0 ;j if n 0 6 = n and (n 0 ; j) 6 = (n; i 0 ), and Pr n 0 ;j is the unique probability measure such that Pr n 0 ;j (n ) = 1 if n 0 = n or (n 0 ; j) = (n; i 0 ), (n 0 ) = (n 0 ) if n 0 6 = n (the de nition of (n ) is irrelevant).
Our construction guarantees that (a) T M;w;k = T M ;w;k (since the way we changed T M;w;k+1 to get M involved only the addition of a node k + 1 away from the root) and (b) M 2 M CP; n n . To see (b), note that there is a common prior that gives probability 1 to n .
We can now easily complete the proof of Theorem 3.10. Suppose ' 0 is a formula satis- By Theorem 3.10, it follows that the formulas in A are also valid in F n n . Thus, ' must also be valid in F, giving us a contradiction.
